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ABSTRACT. This article examines the role of social media in contemporary political communica-
tion, focusing on Barack Obama’s Facebook campaign in the run-up to the 2012 presidential election.
Although there is a growing body of literature on online forms of participation, little research exists on
the role of social buttons on Facebook (like, comment, and share) as tools of political voice. We use
these native interactive features as indicators of how citizens engage with particular political messages.
A content analysis of posts published on Obama’s official Facebook page over the two months leading
up to Election Day was conducted, along with a detailed measurement of all user interactions for each
post. Our analysis indicates that the Obama campaign used Facebook as a tool of top-down promotion,
focusing on Obama’s personality and as a means of strategically guiding followers to act, rather than as
a means of bottom-up empowerment or hybridized coproduction. However, we also found that follow-
ers engaged selectively with campaign messages and often interacted more with policy-oriented posts
than with promotional ones.
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The 2008 U.S. presidential election marked
a significant shift in political campaigning, with20
the Obama campaign making unprecedented use
of social media (Cogburn & Espinoza-Vasquez,
2011; Lilleker & Jackson, 2011). Three years
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later, President Barack Obama broke with con-
vention once again when he publicly announced 25
his reelection bid with a YouTube video and a
tweet on April 4th, 2011. The emphasis on dif-
ferent types of social media during the campaign
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reflects their increasing presence in people’s
daily lives and their potential role in facili-30
tating more direct and interactive communica-
tion between politicians and citizens. Citizens
increasingly access social media for political
news and to share their opinion (Rainie & Smith,
2012; Sweetser & Lariscy, 2008). To what35
extent, though, does this intensive activity across
digital platforms constitute a paradigm shift in
terms of civic engagement with political dis-
course?
An increasingly rich body of literature has40
been looking at online political campaigns in
order to establish whether politicians are uti-
lizing the Internet’s potential to empower citi-
zens and reduce the democratic deficit. Despite
extensive claims about a shift to a new paradigm45
of civic empowerment, existing research has yet
to confirm these hopes: Larsson (2013) found
that, overall, citizens prefer to stay consumers,
and political actors opt for a rather conservative
use of the Web. The extent to which increas-50
ing levels of access, interaction, and civic liter-
acy can create an “architecture of participation”
(Jackson & Lilleker, 2009, p. 232) that will force
politicians to engage in more meaningful ways
remains to be seen.55
This paper looks at Barack Obama’s cam-
paign for the 2012 presidential election, focus-
ing on its presence and content on Facebook,
as well as the response of followers to particu-
lar types of rhetorical strategy and post content.60
The premise of our study is that users selec-
tively interact with some posts and not with
others through Facebook’s native features (likes,
comments, and shares), and that some messages
capture their interest while others are deemed65
not interesting enough to engage with. For that
purpose, we analyzed the Obama campaign’s
communication content on his official Facebook
page (www.facebook.com/BarackObama) in the
run-up to the 2012 election, and how users70
engaged with those messages. In addition to pro-
viding us with a glimpse into the president’s
broader reelection campaign strategy, this quest
can also inform our understanding of politi-
cal communication through social media and75
the extent to which this constitutes a funda-
mentally more interactive paradigm of civic
engagement.
Despite the proliferation of studies on online
political communication, there is little empiri- 80
cal work on engagement through social media
(Carlisle & Patton, 2013). Existing studies focus
either on the strategy of particular campaigns
or on the effects of Internet/social media use
on social capital and political participation 85
in general. Many of these studies are skep-
tical about the existence of any particularly
positive or paradigm-shifting effects, although
Vaccari (2010) argues that we may be wit-
nessing the emergence of a hybridized model 90
of top-down strategic control and bottom-up
civic empowerment during political campaigns.
This study brings together these two concep-
tual strands to examine the content of Obama’s
2012 Facebook campaign and compare it to 95
users’ engagement with particular types of mes-
sages. There are now several published studies
on Obama’s 2008 campaign, whose findings and
questions regarding innovation, interactivity (or
lack of), empowerment (or lack), and differ- 100
ent forms of strategic control (e.g., Baldwin-
Philippi, 2012) can be used as a benchmark
against which to evaluate the 2012 campaign.
THE DIGITIZATION OF “THE
PERMANENT CAMPAIGN” AND THE 105
OBAMA PHENOMENON
The gradual professionalization of political
communication over the last several decades
(Negrine & Lilleker, 2002) was a precursor to a
rapid and radical shift to a much more intense, 110
strategic, and personalized level of campaign-
ing via new media that has taken place in the
last decade. The digitization of the “permanent
campaign” has allowed political parties to reach
out to both loyal and swing voters through- 115
out the electoral cycle, renewing early hopes
regarding the potential of the Web to facili-
tate dialogic communication—and thus a more
substantive relationship—between elected rep-
resentatives and citizens (Kent & Taylor, 1998). 120
Campaign Web sites were originally used to
provide information and mobilize constituents.
Howard Dean was the first to give the Internet
a prominent role in his campaign in the run-
up to the 2004 presidential election (Compton, 125
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2008), but critics have posited that his blog was
merely a facade of interactivity because he made
interactive tools available, but ignored com-
ments from supporters on his blog (Sweetser
& Lariscy, 2008). Online campaigning was still130
at an early stage, with Web sites being treated
as “static campaign flyers” (Endres & Warnick,
2004, p. 323) and used merely for disseminating
information rather than building dialogue.
The extent to which the use of social media,135
e-mail campaigns, and widespread grassroots
mobilization since 2004 and in particular since
2008 signify a return to a paradigm of more
meaningful direct communication between can-
didates and voters is still debated. Yet, it is clear140
that the Internet has had an undeniable impact
on the ways and means through which the pub-
lic engages with politics. In a postmortem about
the 2008 election, Daou (cited in Metzgar and
Maruggi, 2009) wrote that “never before have145
so many people conversed publicly and never
before has the global discourse been so accessi-
ble, recursive and durable” (p. 161). As Pearson
and O’Connell (2012) note, “[i]n 2009, Twitter
was a novelty in politics. In 2012, it’s a neces-150
sity.” This echoes the fact that nearly twice
as many people used social networking sites
(SNSs) in 2011 compared to 2008 (Hampton,
Goulet, Rainie, & Purcell, 2011), with Twitter
users increasing from 3 million to 500 mil-155
lion (Semiocast, 2012), and Facebook exceeding
1 billion users in 2012 (Facebook, 2013).
Much research has been carried out on
the unprecedented use of social media in the
2008 U.S. election, making Obama’s cam-160
paign a seminal case study of social media
use in politics (Cogburn & Espinoza-Vasquez,
2011; Sweetser & Lariscy, 2008; Vaccari 2010;
Woolley, Limperos, & Oliver, 2010). At some
point, the 2008 Obama campaign employed up165
to 100 staff members to work on his social
media presence (Hong & Nadler, 2012). In the
2012 election, the prevalence of social media
increased even further (see Table 1). Donating
was made significantly easier when the Quick170
Donate function was implemented, wherein a
donor’s payment information could be stored so
that next time they were prompted to donate
through an e-mail, text message, or on social
media, they could do so with a single click. The175
TABLE 1. Barack Obama’s Online
Campaigning in 2012 Compared to 2008
2008 2012
Facebook fans 2.4 million 32 million
Digital
fund-raising
$533m∗ $690m
Donations
under $200
45% of total
donations
67% of total
donations
∗In 2012 prices
Obama campaign utilized Twitter’s Q&A ses-
sions feature (http://askobama.twitter.com) and
created an “Ask Me Anything” thread on Reddit
(Reddit, 2012).
Although the literature on the use of social 180
media during the 2012 election campaign is
only now emerging, several questions and con-
cerns are being posed that are consistent with
points raised by previous studies in the United
States and Europe. Based on a series of in-depth 185
interviews with 2012 campaign consultants and
strategists, Serazio’s (2014) study shows “how
campaign operatives labor to manage political
discourse and news agenda(s) in ways antithet-
ical to [the ideals of the Habermasian public 190
sphere], given the opportunities and challenges
that new media technologies afford” (p. 759); in
an effort to attract swing voters who tend to tune
out partisan messages, the president of a polit-
ical advertising agency interviewed by Serazio 195
admits that “you have to figure out a way of
really disassociating yourself from politics to try
to get their attention in the first place” (p. 751).
Shifting away from political debates appears
to help not only attract people’s attention but 200
also control the message. Following a compar-
ison of Barack Obama’s and Mitt Romney’s
Facebook output in the run-up to the 2012 elec-
tion, Bronstein (2013) concludes that “the main
advantage of fandom politics over traditional 205
politics is that it discourages dissent and encour-
ages affective allegiances, i.e., it is easier for
the candidate to maintain the support of their
audience if they like him or her” (p. 185).
Other recent studies on Obama’s use of dig- 210
ital media in 2008 and during his presidency
produced mixed results regarding the paradigm-
shifting nature of his communications output.
4 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & POLITICS
In a review of election campaigning across four
liberal democracies, Lilleker and Jackson (2011)215
found that in all cases (including Obama’s orig-
inal campaign), candidates’ Web sites “were
geared towards furthering the campaign and not
enhancing public engagement with the demo-
cratic process” (p. 190), although they also note220
that the only example of bottom-up communi-
cation was observed on Barack Obama’s blog.
Similarly, Katz, Barris, and Jain (2013) found
that despite “the impression of responsiveness”
(p. 108), the White House has only created dia-225
logical opportunities that do not require more
than a nominal reaction.
However, we still need to establish the precise
rhetorical tools utilized by the Obama campaign
to better understand the extent to which that230
discourse was close-ended and strategic or invit-
ing of further engagement. Kienpointner (2013)
argues that Obama has successfully managed
to incorporate rational argumentation into his
political rhetoric and, by strategically “maneu-235
vering,” to overcome the polarization of partisan
discourse, that is, combining the normative ideal
of rational deliberation with efficient persuasion.
We thus apply the classic Aristotelian model of
rhetorical strategy (logos, ethos, pathos), which240
has proven to still be a valuable tool for the
understanding of political action in contempo-
rary settings (Martin, 2013).
Past political campaigns have used a vari-
ety of rhetorical tools such as informing,245
building relationships with the voter, personal
appeal (directly addressing the audience or using
the imperative mood), building a candidate’s
image, calls to action, denigrating an opponent,
and defending against an opponent’s attacks250
(Sweetser & Lariscy, 2008; Trammell, Williams,
Postelnicu, & Landreville, 2006). It has also
been shown that emotional appeals can be par-
ticularly impactful on how citizens respond to
political messages (Brader, 2005). It is well255
known that in 2008, Obama put strong empha-
sis on hope and looking forward. Indeed, many
studies have looked at the rhetoric and language
of political candidates, but research is only just
beginning to look into the nature of interac-260
tive features on social media (e.g., Bronstein,
2013; Gerlitz & Helmond, 2013; John, 2013),
and there are no known studies examining these
in comparison to the rhetoric and content used
in Facebook posts, including photographs. 265
EMERGING PATTERNS OF ONLINE
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT
The question of whether digital campaigns
utilize the medium’s capacity for democratic
dialogue and even coproduction of policy 270
(Jackson & Lilleker, 2009), or whether they
stick to one-way communication with few
participatory features, is part of a broader
debate between proponents of the theory of
innovation—the view that social media provide 275
us with space for positive, fact-checked, and
decentralized debate, effectively signaling a new
paradigm of civic engagement, and those who
support the theory of normalization—the view
that online campaigns and civic attitudes merely 280
replicate offline traits and phenomena, such as
strategic control, candidate focus, and negative
campaigning (Larsson, 2013). The role and atti-
tudes of citizens—and how their civic activities
can be facilitated or hampered by the medium’s 285
own filters—are also crucial factors.
It has been argued that social media empower
voters, and in particular give young people a
tool to express their civic voices. A study by
Wells and Dudash (2007) showed that two of the 290
most popular sources for political information
among young voters are talking to others and
the Internet. In fact, 27% of 18- to 29-year-olds
even say that SNSs make more of an impact than
in-person advocacy in political campaigning 295
(Harvard University Institute of Politics, 2011).
The same survey also shows that young voters
looked first to national newspapers for politi-
cal news on the 2012 election campaign, then to
what friends shared on Facebook, followed by 300
official Facebook campaign pages. Other stud-
ies expand this to all ages, revealing that voters’
political attitudes and behavior are influenced
by everyday conversations with family mem-
bers or complete strangers (Himelboim, Lariscy, 305
Tinkham, & Sweetser, 2012; Lilleker, 2006).
Some have expressed concerns about the fact
that the Internet seems to favor homophily and
selective exposure, bringing like-minded people
together and functioning only to reinforce their 310
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preexisting beliefs, a phenomenon accentuated
by sophisticated algorithms that are particularly
instrumental across social media, creating a “fil-
ter bubble” that restricts the range of perspec-
tives encountered by citizens online (Pariser,315
2011).
Interestingly, recent studies (e.g., Vaccari,
2013) show that online political campaigns have
also become more efficient at improving recep-
tion and acceptance of political messages. This320
is effectively done when individuals see infor-
mation diffused through low-threshold activi-
ties by supporters, for example, seeing con-
tent shared by peers. Also, reinforcement seems
less relevant when considering undecided vot-325
ers, because they are yet to be persuaded. They
seek emotional and economic stimuli and cues
from the campaign (Lilleker, 2006). However,
research has yet to look at how users engage
with specific political messages on SNSs and330
what type of content is deemed more worthy of
sharing.
Digital tools themselves can be used to cre-
ate or contribute to a public conversation among
voters, and even though such actions do not335
necessarily qualify as political conversations,
the increasing newsworthiness of viral posts
(such as the photo of Barack and Michelle
Obama hugging at a campaign rally, which was
posted after the 2012 election was called and340
became the most tweeted photo to date) is a
reminder that user responses to social media
content have become a distinct cultural phe-
nomenon in their own right. On Facebook, users
can express affirmation of content with a like,345
voice their opinion with a comment, or share
content with their own network. These met-
rics can be studied to understand what type of
political content engages people, among other
potential implications (e.g., impact on public350
policy and institutional legitimacy) and poten-
tial knock-on effects (e.g., benefits for political
awareness and spillover to active, offline par-
ticipation), which fall outside the scope of the
present paper. Facebook’s interface, including355
the architecture of the News Feed (text and
image posts are structurally equal, in contrast to
other social media platforms) and the usability
of the platform’s native features (commenting is
easily completed by typing and pressing enter,360
while liking and sharing only require a single
click), makes it a particularly interesting case
from a political communication perspective.
The conversation on Facebook is partly facili-
tated by posting content, and partly by engaging 365
with existing content through the use of social
buttons. These facilitate cross-syndication and
quick dissemination of Web content (Gerlitz &
Helmond, 2013). The like button was originally
introduced to “replace short affective statements 370
like ‘Awesome’ and ‘Congrats!’” (Gerlitz &
Helmond, 2013, p. 5). Little research exists
on the motivation behind why people like on
Facebook, but the intuitive assumption is that
the number of likes implies exposure, atten- 375
tion, and some sort of affirmation, ratification,
or endorsement of what is posted. Essentially,
a post with many interactions has evidently
grabbed more attention and spread more widely,
whereas a post with fewer interactions has not 380
been deemed worthy or interesting to engage
with. Sharing on social media is an active prac-
tice of communication and distribution. It is not
sharing in the traditional sense where you give
something, so that you consequently have less. 385
It is a nonsacrificial act of participation, benefit-
ing from the positive connotations of the tradi-
tional concept of sharing (John, 2013). Hence, it
is a less costly and lower-level form of participa-
tion, but still signifies dissemination, exposure, 390
and citizen dialogue.
Having noted that, SNSs are merely a plat-
form facilitating communication to and between
voters. Pearson and O’Connell (2012) argue that
it is not the number of followers that determines 395
one’s influence on Twitter; it is how one uses
those 140 letters. Metzgar and Maruggi (2009)
contend that social media is just a tool and can-
not replace “message, motivation, or strategy”
(p. 141). Similarly, Vaccari (2010) reiterates the 400
role of contextual factors, arguing that technol-
ogy is merely the driver of preexisting motiva-
tions. Hence, the medium-specific aspects of a
particular campaign—such as Facebook’s native
features—ought to be examined in conjunction 405
with fundamental social, cultural, political, and
psychological aspects of political communica-
tion and engagement.
It could be argued that the emergence of civic
consumerism—which this type of user-oriented 410
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selective online engagement is part of—poses
challenges for democratic engagement and tra-
ditional notions of civic duty, because citizens
and especially young people demand to see
the relevance of issues to their own every-415
day lives (Gerodimos, 2008, 2012). Facebook
founder Mark Zuckerberg’s modus operandi,
that is, that “[a] squirrel dying in front of your
house may be more relevant to your inter-
ests right now than people dying in Africa”420
(Kirkpatrick, 2010, p. 296) raises further ques-
tions about the role of empathy and values in
contemporary civic engagement through social
media.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND DESIGN425
This study seeks to examine how people
respond to specific political messages online
using social buttons as metrics of civic engage-
ment. Based on this context, our two starting
assumptions are that (a) Facebook interactions430
such as liking, commenting and sharing are
part of the everyday conversation that repre-
sents and shapes individuals’ political attitudes;
and (b) the number of interactions on Facebook
posts more or less reflects what captures fol-435
lowers’ attention, at least at a basic quantitative
level. Focusing on the 2012 Obama campaign on
Facebook, the aim of the study is to analyze the
content of campaign posts and the response of
followers and, more broadly, to examine what440
these patterns of interaction tell us about the
depth and interactivity of online political com-
munication and the potential for meaningful
civic engagement.
In particular we pose the following research445
questions:
RQ1. Content/Strategy: What were the
main types of posts, themes, and
rhetorical tools used by the Obama
campaign on Facebook, and did450
these constitute a top-down strate-
gic communications output or an
attempt to foster two-way engage-
ment with voters?
RQ2. Reception/Engagement: Which of 455
the frames, policy areas, and rhetori-
cal devices used were most success-
ful in terms of Facebook follower
engagement (measured through the
number of likes, comments, and 460
shares)?
For the purposes of this study we conducted a
content analysis of all 166 posts1 published on
the Obama campaign’s official Facebook page
over 67 days, leading up to Election Day, that is, 465
from September 1 to November 6, 2012. Three
of these posts were photo albums and were not
included in the final coding (N = 163) as they
were classified as folders (groups of many pic-
tures). Every post was recorded onto a spread- 470
sheet, with text, picture, video, and hyperlink as
appropriate, and, along with these, the number
of interactions (see Figure 1). The coding pro-
cess involved looking at the impact of content
(themes and rhetoric), structure (graphics, text 475
length), and strategy (frequency of posts, tem-
poral context, which day of the week posts were
published) on the number of likes, comments,
and shares that each post received. A higher
number of interactions was assumed to indi- 480
cate a higher level of engagement with the post
content by Facebook users.
The codes used were a mixture of select
codes from past literature along with codes
deduced from the content and rhetoric of 485
the posts. For example, Benoit’s functional
approach, which examines the division between
acclaims, attacks, and defense strategies (Benoit
& Benoit, 2005) was employed to compare
sentiment with past campaign communication 490
strategies. Additionally, the coding scheme fea-
tured six categories deduced from the samples:
post structure, Aristotelian rhetoric, rhetorical
devices, policy themes, picture content, and call
to action. These were further divided into 46 dif- 495
ferent codes, which were interpreted in dichoto-
mous categories, sorted by present (1) or absent
(0) for each post (Trammell et al., 2006). (For
intercoder reliability see Table 2.) The data was
reviewed twice to refine the discovered codes 500
Gerodimos and Justinussen 7
FIGURE 1. Sample post from Barack Obama’s official Facebook page.
TABLE 2. Coding Categories for Content Analysis and Intercoder Reliability
Coding categories Variables
Cohen’s
kappa∗
Benoit’s functional approach Acclaim (person/policy) .732 (p = .005)
Attack (person/policy), Defense 1 (p < .001)
Aristotelian rhetoric Logic, None 1 (p < .001)
Credibility .857 (p = .001)
Emotion .865 (p = .001)
Rhetorical device Question, Policy statement, Fact/statistic, Collective
appeal, Personal appeal, Quote, Humor, Celebrity
endorsement
1 (p < .001)
Call to Action .815 (p = .001)
Urgency .865 (p = .001)
Call to action Donate, Buy/offer, Competition, Vote, Support/Get
involved, Find out more
1 (p < .001)
Share .815 (p = .001)
Policy themes Foreign policy, Unemployment, Economy, Health care,
Energy, Education, Taxes, Women’s rights
1 (p < .001)
Post structure Video, Picture, Text only, Hyperlink 1 (p < .001)
Photo content Barack Obama, Michelle Obama, Daughters, Joe Biden,
People, Politicians, Promotion, Policy, Quote, Prompt to
share
1 (p < .001)
∗On a random 10% of the sample, two coders, blind coding
and categories (Saldaña, 2009). Because pic-
tures are very prominent in Facebook posts,
often being the main carrier of a message or
complementing the written text, the coding pro-
cess looked at the picture and text in a post505
combined. However, this merely involved look-
ing at the textual content and explicit elements
in a picture (Table 2), and did not interpret con-
notations or associations that a picture might
evoke in a reader. Video and link content was 510
8 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & POLITICS
not analyzed, because this is not immediately
visible to the user browsing the posts on the
Obama campaign’s Facebook page. These ele-
ments require a level of active (albeit minimal)
effort from the user—opening the link or press-515
ing the play button—who only then is exposed
to the message contained therein.
For the data analysis we initially used Mann-
Whitney’s U to compare the means of likes,
comments, and shares across all the dichoto-520
mous coding categories. We then run multi-
ple regression tests, treating the various post
content/structure features as independent vari-
ables and likes (R2 = .636), comments (R2 =
.466), and shares (R2 = .461) as the dependent525
variable. Based on those findings we then run an
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) test to fur-
ther cross-check the impact of various factors
on likes, comments, and shares, while control-
ling for certain variables that appeared to have a530
significant effect.
FINDINGS
Our analysis indicates that, overall, the
Obama campaign treated Facebook as a tool
of top-down promotion, as opposed to a means535
of substantive civic interaction. Furthermore,
while messages were highly personalized, both
in terms of focusing on Obama’s personality and
directly addressing the user, they focused more
on the symbolic and affective aspects of political 540
communication than on political argumentation
and issue-oriented campaigning. However, inter-
estingly, campaign followers were quite selec-
tive about which messages they engaged with,
often rejecting certain types of posts (if we 545
accept the study’s premise that not interacting
with a post can be considered an indication of
rejection or selective engagement on the part
of Facebook users). Before presenting the sub-
stantive findings in more detail, we first outline 550
the frequency, volume, and intensity of cam-
paign messages and user interactions across the
two-month period.
Campaign and User Interaction Overview
Although the number of page likes (i.e., the 555
total number of users who effectively subscribed
to Barack Obama’s Facebook page) increased
from 28 million in early September of 2008 to
31.8 million in early November (see Figure 2)—
meaning that an increased number of users were 560
exposed to the president’s messages in their
Facebook News Feed—the number of post inter-
actions remained mainly steady with a slowly
increasing trend line and large fluctuations.
Consistency in the social media communica- 565
tion strategy was apparent in that two to three
posts were published on most days, with an aver-
age length of 19.8 words each (see Figure 3).
Limiting Facebook communications to such a
FIGURE 2. Time line—Total likes of Obama’s official Facebook page.
Source: InsideFacebook.com 2012
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FIGURE 3. Number of Facebook posts published daily by the Obama campaign (September 1st to
November 6th, 2012).
small core of posts per day maintains a stable570
amount of output in order to avoid the contrast
between busy and slow news days (or between
periods of aggressive or positive and cautious or
defensive campaigning); additionally, it ensures
that followers’ attention is not diluted, given575
especially the mechanics of Facebook’s per-
sonalization algorithm, which prioritizes and
manipulates the visibility of posts on a user’s
News Feed (Pariser, 2011).
The stable and relatively small number of580
posts comes into stark contrast with the highly
volatile and energetic user interaction with those
posts (see Figure 4). Beyond the weekly flow
of likes (peaking on Wednesdays and dipping
on Saturdays), comments (dipping on Sundays),585
and shares (dipping on Fridays to Sundays),
the occasional peaks in interactions highlight
key events, such as the debates, the Obamas’
20th anniversary, and Election Day. Although it
is obvious that this graph only captures events590
mentioned by the campaign itself, it still gives
us an interesting overview of how followers
interacted with these events. For example, the
day after the third debate (October 23, 2012), a
post stated, “Share this if you agree: President595
Obama won the final debate . . .” and the
number of interactions peaked for likes, com-
ments, and shares. Furthermore, the comparative
overlay of all likes, shares, and comments across
the 67 days of analysis in Figure 4 shows that 600
people interact differently with different posts.
For example, some posts peak in comments but
not in likes and shares.
Although a like is the easiest way to engage
(it only requires a click), and therefore receives 605
significantly more interactions than comments
or shares, the variation across dates and events
suggests that the three interactive features are
different not only in terms of effort. As demon-
strated below, they also signify different mean- 610
ings and constitute different ways of engaging
with a given message. This may be more appli-
cable to younger voters in particular, who are
more likely to perceive online interactions as
a viable form of political participation: a like 615
is arguably a way of affirming or ratifying that
which is said; a comment allows for voicing
one’s opinion, and a share is about sharing
information with one’s own connections. The
changed perception of political participation is 620
also evident in that, according to some studies,
young social media users are not as interested in
more costly activities such as fund-raising, but
rather in debating and establishing relationships
with the candidate and fellow supporters, which 625
can be confined to mere interactions on a social
media platform (Sweetser & Lariscy, 2008).
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FIGURE 4. Overlay of likes, comments, and shares per post (September 1st to November 6th,
2012).
Campaign Content and Strategy:
Facebook as a Tool of Top-Down630
Personalized Promotion
The overwhelming majority of the messages
posted by the campaign in the 67 days before
the 2012 election were picture posts, that is,
they featured a single photo, usually along635
with an accompanying caption, text, or com-
mentary (see Table 3). This aligns well with
Facebook’s ethos about sharing visual con-
tent, because the platform recently announced
a design change to make picture content more640
prominent (Forbes, 2013). More than half of the
TABLE 3. User Interaction with Different Post
Formats
All posts
(N = 163) Picture Video Text-only Hyperlink
n 154 7 2 125
% 94.5 4.3 1.2 76.7
Likes
(Mean)
195,252 38,468 126,065 174,146
Comments
(Mean)
12,782 3,826 6,169 12,509
Shares
(Mean)
21,842 4,856 4,835 17,753
photo posts featured Barack Obama himself—
actively speaking, hugging supporters, on the
phone, or with an affective appeal where he is
with his family or with a clear expression of 645
readiness to take on a second term—while a
further 13% featured his wife and/or daugh-
ters alone (see Table 4). Very few videos are
posted and the vast majority of hyperlinks link
to the campaign Web site (www.barackobama. 650
com) or other campaign sites, with only a few
linking to the following external sources: White
House Blog, Beyoncé Web site (endorsement),
TABLE 4. Applying Benoit’s Functional
Approach
Overall posts
(N = 163) n %
Mean likes
per post
Mean
comments
per post
Mean
shares
per post
Acclaims 78 47.9 213,944 13,331 21,672
character 49 30.1 239,481 13,283 20,935
policy 29 17.8 171,989 13,954 23,290
Attacks 31 19.0 178,502 15,656 24,455
character 15 9.2 161,980 13,142 19,484
policy 17 10.4 190,389 17,492 29,315
Defense 0 0 — — —
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Red Cross donations (Hurricane Sandy), and
The Daily Show (interview with Obama).655
Moving on to the content of the text accom-
panying the images, we found that Obama’s
2012 Facebook campaign was mostly posi-
tive and avoided highly polarizing or negative
attacks. Using Benoit’s functional approach in660
the coding process allowed us to draw com-
parisons to previous studies using the same
theoretical framework (Benoit & Benoit, 2005;
Compton, 2008; Sweetser & Lariscy, 2008;
Trammell et al., 2006). No defensive responses665
were made to Romney’s attacks (although the
“Obama Truth Team” Facebook page was more
concerned with deflecting attacks and counter-
maneuvers), which is somewhat different from
previous campaigns, although, even in the past,670
defensive responses were only used on a small
scale (Compton, 2008).
Nearly half of the posts (N = 163) on the
official Obama Facebook page were acclaims
followed by a considerably smaller number of675
opponent attacks (Table 4). Compared to the
2008 social media campaign, where the divide
between character- and policy-focused acclaims
was about 55%/45%, respectively (Compton,
2008), stronger emphasis was placed on charac-680
ter acclaims in the 2012 election and less on pol-
icy (62%/38%). Furthermore, while 78.8% of
policy statements in the 2004 Bush versus Kerry
campaign were attacks against the opponent,
only 52% were attacks against character and685
policy in this campaign. Sixty-four percent of
policy statements included acclaims of Obama’s
own character and policies, suggesting a more
positive tone. This is consistent with previous
studies of both the 2008 (Lilleker & Jackson,690
2011) and the 2012 (Bronstein, 2013) cam-
paigns, which found that the Obama team opted
for a broadcast message of hope and enthu-
siasm, while only using negative campaign-
ing through “under the radar” microtargeting695
(Serazio, 2014, p. 745).
In terms of the rhetorical tools employed, the
case for Obama is mostly built on emotions
(pathos) and credibility (ethos) and less so on
rational arguments (logos). In fact three-quarters700
of character acclaims use emotionally charged
phrases such as “Obama has revealed himself to
be a man who cares about all Americans,” “. . .
a president who stands up for all Americans . . .
,” and “President Obama’s leadership has made 705
America stronger, safer, and more secure . . .” A
key vehicle for the framing of Obama’s credibil-
ity was quotes: nearly one-third of all posts used
quotes to make a point and the great majority
of them contained some form of emotive lan- 710
guage and credibility appeal. Only one-quarter
of posts contained policy statements, which is
very similar to the proportion of policy messages
featuring in blogs during the 2004 campaign
(Trammell et al., 2006). 715
Given the highly personalized nature of the
American political system, it is not unusual
for a presidential campaign to focus on the
person of the individual candidate as opposed
to more political, institutional, or processual 720
aspects of the campaign. Even so, our anal-
ysis shows that Obama’s reelection campaign
on Facebook focused predominantly on his per-
sonality and family, rather than on his policies,
ideas, track record, or opponent, which is some- 725
what surprising for a sitting president whose first
term featured historic executive, legislative, and
judicial debates and decisions.
Crucially, policy posts were not framed as
opportunities for substantive debate or engage- 730
ment, that is, “conversation starters”; they were
used as hooks for a call to action, such as sharing
(50%), showing support (7%), voting (7%), and
finding out more (2.4%). This finding reflects
more broadly the entire discourse of the cam- 735
paign, which was close-ended, promotional, and
highly guarded or controlled. For example, out
of 163 posts, only nine contained any type of
question, perhaps a somewhat crude but still
important indicator of whether the discourse 740
figuratively or literally attempts to engage the
audience in a substantive discussion. Even more
tellingly, out of those nine questions only one
could be characterized as potentially substan-
tive, but even that was tied to a call for action 745
(“Why are you voting for President Obama?
Leave your No. 1 reason in the comments and
tag a friend to let them know”). All other
questions were fully procedural or promotional
(“Got a phone? Got Internet? GET HIS BACK. 750
Call.barackobama.com”; “Voting by mail? Put
a stamp on that ballot and send it in today”;
“Would you describe yourself as a ‘talker’?
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TABLE 5. User Interaction with Different Types
of Rhetorical Device
All posts
(N = 163) n %
Mean
likes
per post
Mean
comments
per post
Mean
shares
per post
Call to action 113 69.3 179,970 12,224 21,867
Personal
appeal
97 59.5 170,743 11,572 22,062
Quote 49 30.1 221,241 14,894 23,437
Urgency 45 27.6 151,480 10,482 15,409
Policy
statement
42 25.8 177,753 13,786 25,601
Collective
appeal
41 25.2 195,118 12,192 22,654
Fact/statistic 22 13.5 139,762 11,091 14,606
Humor 10 6.1 257,067 11,977 21,082
Question 9 5.5 187,568 11,961 14,365
Hit the phones for the president if you’ve got
Barack’s back”).755
Calls for action and personal appeal (i.e., the
use of imperative mood in the sentence structure
toward the reader, prompting some sort of action
in response to the post) were the two most-used
rhetorical devices (see Table 5). Interestingly, on760
Howard Dean’s blog during the 2004 primaries
campaign, only one-quarter of posts focused on
making the reader feel part of the campaign
(Trammell et al., 2006), while 71.8% of posts
in Obama’s 2012 campaign used personal or765
collective appeal. This could be attributed to
a number of factors, such as the much more
direct and personal mode of communication on
Facebook, the increasing importance of person-
alization in contemporary political culture, and770
the fact that the Obama campaign has strategi-
cally and consistently utilized social media to
mobilize public support and facilitate a sense of
belonging (Katz et al., 2013; Lilleker & Jackson,
2011).775
The prominence of mobilization is evident in
the campaign’s Facebook strategy, with 69.3%
of posts prompting engagement in a wide range
of subcategories recognized (see Table 6). Seven
types of call to action were recognized, with780
“prompting to share” being mostly used. The
implied message in most posts was to use the
native share function on Facebook to spread
the message and make Obama’s campaign more
TABLE 6. User Interaction with Different Types
of Call to Action
Call to action
posts (n = 113) n %
Mean
likes
per post
Mean
comments
per post
Mean
shares
per post
Call to share 41 36.3 221,204 14,557 36,450
Show support 22 19.5 172,682 10,789 12,987
Vote 18 15.9 214,071 13,549 21,444
Find out more 15 13.3 133,789 12,420 13,235
Donate 15 13.3 125,883 11,113 11,124
Buy/special
offer
5 4.4 72,241 4,677 4,000
Join
competition
4 3.5 67,807 6,401 4,645
visible on the social media platform. Donations 785
are only mentioned in 9.2% of posts overall,
compared to Howard Dean’s blog campaign
in 2003 and 2004, which encouraged dona-
tions in 15.7% of posts (Trammell et al., 2006).
However, Obama’s campaign encouraged indi- 790
vidual involvement (show support, share) in
38.7% of overall posts compared to Dean’s
12.5% (Trammell et al., 2006), illustrating a
more intensive usage of social media to mobi-
lize grass roots and disseminate information 795
(Sweetser & Lariscy, 2008), but also a strategy
that is much more professional and segmented
in order to match the particular traits and user
trends of each platform.
Finally, the language employed across posts 800
largely constitutes a very personal and direct
communication approach. As indicated earlier,
much focus is placed on President Obama him-
self, as well as employing personal appeals
that attempt to close the discursive and politi- 805
cal gap between the reader and the candidate.
Words such as you, your, you’ve, you’re, and
yours occur 136 times throughout the 163 posts.
Additionally, the words we, we’ve, us, and
our occur 67 times, and the word friend or 810
friends occurred 19 times in the context of
phrases such as “let your friends know” or “your
friends should see this.” Facebook’s core pur-
pose of connecting people was appropriated by
the Obama campaign as it sought to emulate the 815
interpersonal connectivity that is native to the
platform.
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User Response and Engagement:
Rewarding Positivity; Resisting
Promotions820
As mentioned earlier, the great majority of the
Obama campaign’s Facebook posts in the run-
up to the election featured images. We found
that the presence of Obama in a photo post had
a statistically significant positive effect on the825
number of likes (r = .373, p < .001), comments
(r = .363, p < .001), and shares (r = .265, p =
.002) it received. The presence of the First Lady
Michelle Obama or of Obama’s daughters in a
photo had an even more engaging effect: such830
posts received on average 70%–80% more likes
than the other most popular type of post cate-
gory, that is, photos featuring the president on
his own.
Our analysis of campaign followers’ reac-835
tions to its Facebook posts produced a surprising
dichotomy: substantive posts (about policy or
even about Obama’s character) were far more
engaging and successful in getting people to
share them than personal appeals and promo-840
tional calls. One major exception to that was
Calls to Share: such prompts had a statistically
significant effect on likes (r = .199, p = .015) as
well as on actual shares (r = .309, p < .001;
the average number of shares for posts when845
prompted to do so was 36,450, while for all
other posts the average was 15,508 shares) and
even more so when that prompt was embedded
in a photo (r = .444, p < .001), regardless of
whether the president appeared in the photo or850
not.
It is worth pointing out that one of the two
text-only posts received significantly higher lev-
els of attention (230,000 likes, 7,126 comments,
and 9,006 shares) than the other:855
President Obama: “We don’t turn back.
We leave no one behind. We pull
each other up.” If this sounds like the
America you believe in, keep us mov-
ing forward: http://OFA.BO/FzuNUH—860
September 7, 2012
In contrast, the other post received only
22,469 likes, 5,212 comments, and 664
shares:
Last call: Enter before midnight for 865
your chance to join Beyoncé, Jay-Z,
and President Obama for an evening in
New York. We’ll fly you in with a guest:
http://OFA.BO/eW6Anj—September, 14,
2012 870
This contrast in user responses to the two types
of messages (value-oriented emotive message
versus promotional) is precisely typical of how
followers reacted to the campaign on Facebook.
It also reiterates the power of language, even 875
when there is no visual aid.
Furthermore, during the 67-day period, the
campaign posted seven videos on the official
Facebook page. Our analysis shows that these
videos failed to engage users: posts featuring a 880
video had a statistically significant negative cor-
relation with the number of likes (β = −.358,
p < .001), comments (β = −.276, p = .003),
and shares (β = −.235, p = .012). In fact, video
posts received much less interactions even than 885
text-only posts (see Table 7). The reason for
this may be the extra time and effort required
TABLE 7. User Interaction with Posts
Featuring Photos
Picture posts
(n = 154) n %
Mean
likes
per post
Mean
comments
per post
Mean
shares
per post
Barack
Obama
78 50.6 246,610 15,392 27,941
People 40 26.0 159,986 9,337 11,103
Policy 33 21.4 159,679 14,132 25,109
Quote 32 19.3 222,838 16,300 27,487
Michelle
Obama
18 11.7 310,975 14,167 26,222
Politicians 17 11.0 163,319 14,490 21,156
Promotions 11 7.1 61,374 6,274 4,133
Joe Biden 10 6.5 270,473 14,470 26,802
Prompting to
share
9 5.8 265,159 14,799 72,516
Event 7 4.5 88,728 7,055 6,585
Celebrities 4 2.6 71,951 4,662 7,430
Obama’s
daughters
3 1.9 449,420 15,061 32,904
Map 3 1.9 75,305 7,681 6,273
Obama and
Michelle
10 6.5 421,482 20,158 39,097
Obama and
daughters
3 1.9 449,420 15,061 32,904
14 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & POLITICS
to digest the message in a video. Although
the message in an image or text is instantly
apparent, a video requires playing and watch-890
ing the video (which in turn requires adequate
bandwidth, sound, and privacy). This may sug-
gest that videos are less efficient at reaching
a Facebook audience whose News Feeds are
already saturated with updates from friends and895
other fan pages. Or it could merely indicate that
campaign followers have particular expectations
(and receive the corresponding gratifications)
from different platforms, such as Facebook,
Twitter, and YouTube. Hence, Facebook may900
not be a particularly efficient way of promoting
a video.
Moving to how users engaged with differ-
ent types of rhetoric and post content, the
literature on political rhetoric and persuasion905
has long acknowledged the salience of the
three elements of Aristotelian rhetoric (logos,
pathos, and ethos) and the impact of politi-
cal messages that are “reasonable, passionate,
and reflective of the character of the speaker”910
(Triadafilopoulos, 1999, p. 741), respectively.
Our analysis shows that posts making use of
one or more of those elements were much more
engaging (see Figure 5). Emotive language in
particular dominates much of the campaign on915
Facebook, being employed in more than half of
the posts (see Table 8) and emerged as one of
the three most impactful variables (the other two
being photos of Obama and prompts to share).
The use of pathos seems to have struck a chord920
with campaign followers because emotional
TABLE 8. User Interaction with Posts
Featuring Elements of Aristotelian Rhetoric
All posts
(N = 163) n %
Mean
likes
per post
Mean
comments
per post
Mean
shares
per post
Pathos
(emotion)
94 57.7 226,687 14,153 25,782
Ethos
(credibility)
68 41.7 226,865 14,939 24,893
Logos (logic) 37 22.7 167,142 14,565 24,195
None 39 23.9 118,236 8,559 10,386
acclaims received on average 50,000 more likes
than nonemotional ones. Similarly, 59.5% of
posts denigrating the opponent used emotional
language compared to 24.4% in the 2004 cam- 925
paign between George Bush and John Kerry
(Trammell et al., 2006).
Words such as care, trust, cheer on, fired
up and fighting for were seen as appealing to
emotions, and, contrary to Bronstein (2013), we 930
found that this type of discourse did have a sig-
nificant impact on how much people liked (β =
.273, ηρ2 = .080, p < .001), commented on (β =
.208, ηρ2 = .053, p = .006), and shared posts
(r = .213, p = .007) even when having con- 935
trolled for the presence of photos and prompts
to share. This is in line with the contentions
that the emotional dimension of rhetoric is an
increasingly vital part of contemporary politi-
cal communication and youth engagement with 940
the potential to initiate their involvement and
influence their voting choice (Brader, 2005).
FIGURE 5. User interaction with posts featuring emotional appeal.
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The campaign was also successful in engag-
ing followers with messages focusing on
Obama’s ethos, that is, his credibility and sta-945
tus, because such messages received more likes
(U = 1981, p < .001), comments (U = 2851.5,
p < .001), and shares (U = 1964, p < .001) than
non-ethos posts. The strategic emphasis on hope
and enthusiasm, as opposed to the use of neg-950
ative or attack messages, was rewarded by fol-
lowers: positive acclaims were more likely to be
shared than other types of posts (ηρ2 = .043,
p = .016) even when controlling for prompts to
share, which as mentioned below emerged as a955
key factor.
The inclusion of logical reasoning (logos)
did not increase the likelihood of a post receiv-
ing more likes. This is interesting as it may
indicate the limits of reason in contemporary960
political discourse (or it could simply mean
that the Obama campaign was just not as good
at framing logical arguments as they were at
projecting emotions and credibility). However,
citizens who followed the Obama campaign on965
Facebook were willing to engage in a public
dialogue on posts that utilized rational argumen-
tation, because the use of logos had a statis-
tically significant relationship with the number
of shares (U = 1489, p = .001) and comments970
(U = 1826, p = .045) and they still engaged sub-
stantively with policy content (see Table 9). This
can actually be attributed to the presence of par-
ticular policy themes: education posts were by
far the most popular, while statements on taxes975
(ηρ2 = .029, p = .045) and foreign policy (ηρ2 =
TABLE 9. User Interaction with Different Policy
Areas and Issues
Policy
statements
(n = 42) n %
Mean
likes per
post
Mean
comments
per post
Mean
shares
per post
Unemployment 11 26 170,319 17,531 23,778
Women’s
Rights
11 26 183,370 12,021 26,774
Taxes 10 24 156,003 22,259 21,557
Education 9 21 214,364 19,221 27,961
Economy 9 21 198,031 21,511 24,759
Health Care 8 19 160,236 13,182 22,466
Foreign Policy 4 10 198,729 22,213 26,897
Energy 4 10 170,432 23,828 24,812
.027, p = .052) attracted significantly greater
numbers of comments, having controlled for the
presence of a photo.
On the other hand, posts featuring action- 980
oriented personal appeal (e.g., “If you’re stand-
ing with the president, we’ve got a free sticker
for you” or “Make sure your friends and family
know the choice on taxes in this election”) were
less likely to be liked (U = 2515, p = .020). 985
Similarly, we found that posts about competi-
tions (β = −.173, p = .017), promotional links
(β = −.235, p = .029), and photos of celebri-
ties (β = −.318, p = .045) received significantly
less user interaction. 990
DISCUSSION: THE POWER AND
LIMITS OF POLITICAL
PERSONALIZATION
Our analysis showed that the Obama cam-
paign made highly strategic and focused use 995
of Facebook as a tool for promoting its key
messages and, crucially, for mobilizing support-
ers to act on its behalf. The main focus of
the posts was Obama’s personality and fam-
ily, while rhetorically, the campaign depended 1000
mostly on emotions (pathos) and to a lesser
extent on credibility (ethos). Although pol-
icy statements did feature during the sampled
period, they were obscured by a preoccupation
with Obama’s character and also by daily calls 1005
to action. These findings largely concur with
recent studies (Bronstein, 2013; Katz, Barris &
Jain, 2013; Lilleker & Jackson, 2011; Serazio,
2014) that challenge the widespread percep-
tion of the Obama campaign’s digital presence 1010
as revolutionary and emphasize the continuing
importance of campaign strategy.
A closer look at Obama’s own style, as
well as of the particular political context
within which the 2012 campaign took place, 1015
offers an interesting explanation for the cam-
paign’s focus on personality rather than record.
Foley (2013) argues that the gap between
Obama’s grand rhetorical vision and every-
day policy pragmatism has produced a cer- 1020
tain kind of presidential ambiguity that ham-
pers his attempt to connect with the American
people. Negotiating that gap—which involves
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defending, contextualizing, and explaining com-
plex policies and decisions that the president1025
may genuinely believe to be the right ones—is
a process of translation that requires substantive
engagement with people’s realities and knowl-
edge gaps. This process has been impeded not
only by Obama’s own style of decision mak-1030
ing, which tends to be introverted and reflec-
tive (Foley, 2013), but also by the actions of
other actors in the public sphere of the United
States. Furthermore, the adverse economic cir-
cumstances of Obama’s first term have meant1035
that a core part of his record could only be
framed as what Foley calls a “negative achieve-
ment,” that is, the economy not getting worse.
In this context, the capacity of new media such
as Facebook to allow for potentially direct com-1040
munication between the president and the public
could have provided him with a way of bypass-
ing the “noise” produced by other political
actors.
Despite the intensive use of personalization1045
in a rhetorical attempt to close the gap between
the candidate and his supporters, the discourse
of the Obama campaign on Facebook was highly
managed and close-ended: only one out of
163 posts asked followers to consider what1050
could be classified as a substantive question.
Therefore, although the campaign successfully
used Facebook to extend and mobilize its fan
base, the strategic discourse did not encourage
the creation of loops of feedback, which are1055
key to building a dialogic relationship (Kent &
Taylor, 1998). By focusing on Obama’s fam-
ily and personality, the campaign essentially
controlled the discussion, because neither of
these topics is particularly conducive to substan-1060
tive and in-depth political engagement on the
part of the citizens. Although policy discourse
could be equally close-ended, readers may
hold strong opinions and be prepared to artic-
ulate them, challenging the official message.1065
Hence, our evidence concurs with Baldwin-
Philippi (2012), who identified and described
emerging aspects of indirect and discreet con-
trol exercised by political campaigns on the
Web, such as self-censorship, determining what1070
participants will talk about (agenda-setting),
focusing on winnable topics, and nonissue
coverage.
Vaccari (2010) argues that Obama’s
2008 campaign use of innovative forms of 1075
political communication, such as data-assisted
guidance, constituted a hybrid model of top-
down control and bottom-up empowerment
(while also noting the tensions that occasionally
occur between the two). Yet, postmodern 1080
personalization and strategic segmentation are
different from real empowerment and dialogue,
especially when the outcome and substance of
the campaign’s policies, issue responses, and
overall discourse are entirely managed from the 1085
center. In other words, the fact that political
advertising (because this is essentially what the
Obama campaign’s Facebook posts constituted)
is becoming much more sophisticated and
rhetorically personalized does not make it any 1090
less strategic. On the contrary, it is precisely
this unprecedented level of organization and
discipline—translating into a highly integrated
and strategic use of new media—that, according
to previous studies, was vital to the Obama 1095
campaign’s success in 2008 (Cogburn &
Espinoza-Vasquez, 2011). Although Facebook
posts on the campaign’s official page may not
be the ideal vehicle for microtargeted messages,
the increasing sophistication, scope, and reach 1100
of Facebook’s personalization algorithm (see
Gerodimos & Gray, 2013)—along with a
strategic shift toward the integration of ads into
the News Feed may soon allow that kind of
campaigning to take place through Facebook, 1105
too.
Directing Facebook followers to spread the
campaign’s message may signify an important
change in terms of where and how political
campaigning takes place, but it does not nec- 1110
essarily constitute a paradigm shift in terms of
truly interactive communication between politi-
cians and citizens. Having said that, even close-
ended and strategic rhetoric, almost by defini-
tion, entails the agency of citizens, its success 1115
depending on the extent to which it can capture
the moment and articulate issues, conflicts, or
sociopolitical cleavages that are salient among
the people (kairos and stasis, respectively; see
Martin, 2013). In other words, political broad- 1120
casting requires an acute understanding of how
citizens feel and what they need; listening is a
prerequisite of successful strategic rhetoric.
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Furthermore, the act and process of engag-
ing with a campaign may well have multiple1125
benefits for a citizen’s civic skills (such as polit-
ical sophistication), social capital, and overall
participation. In fact, Bode (2012) argues that,
through interaction, conversation, and possible
preference alteration, Facebook use may not just1130
lead to civic skills but may also influence users.
In that respect, future research should try to
look at the effects and benefits of civic inter-
action on social media beyond the instances of
communication itself.1135
At this point, the limitations of the study
should be acknowledged. Although our analy-
sis captured every message posted in the two
months before the 2012 election, this sample is
still a partial snapshot in the context of a massive1140
and multimedia campaign that had started sev-
eral months before Election Day. Furthermore,
due to the study’s angle, we did not log or ana-
lyze the content of comments posted by follow-
ers on the campaign’s various posts. Although1145
such an undertaking would have certainly pro-
duced valuable insights regarding the quality,
nature, and depth of civic deliberation among
Obama’s followers, it fell outside of this partic-
ular analysis’s remit. The number of interactions1150
each post received is a metric that can only pro-
vide tentative and indicative findings of what
content people are more likely to engage with on
Facebook. A broad range of elements will influ-
ence that process of engagement: users’ personal1155
attitude to politics and social media use, their
habits in using social media (some never like,
others always like), the temporal and geograph-
ical context around a particular message, the
cultural and social context around the sent mes-1160
sage, and the individual’s situational context
(mood, in a rush, personal bias). It is impos-
sible to measure all of these on a large scale.
However, significant associations were estab-
lished, revealing—or rather, suggesting—a gen-1165
eral tendency or inclination to engage more with
particular themes or types of rhetoric. Although
users exposed to published messages are in the
first instance those who have liked (effectively
subscribed to) Obama’s official Facebook page,1170
hence implying a Democrat inclination in a
majority of the target audience, when an individ-
ual likes or shares a post, this becomes visible to
their networks, exposing other Facebook users
to the published messages as well. 1175
Finally, as our intention was to look at merely
what was “on the page” and how users engaged
with that material at the basic level of using
Facebook’s features, we cannot make conclusive
claims about the intentions of the campaign’s 1180
communication strategists or, indeed, about any
long-term effects on the followers or the exter-
nalities of the messages communicated through
that page. Still, our analysis produced a rich
body of data that provides us with important 1185
insights regarding both the 2012 Obama cam-
paign itself and, more broadly, about emerging
patterns of online political communication and
engagement.
Further qualitative research is needed into 1190
the motivations, meanings, and significance of
a Facebook interaction (like/comment/share) to
the platform’s users. For example, does a “like”
only express positive sentiments? How much
affinity or endorsement is usually a prerequi- 1195
site to liking content (merely superficial and
impulsive response or significant and meaning-
ful agreement)? And how does an individual
decide what to share and what not to?
Thinking more broadly in terms of the rela- 1200
tionship between new media and political com-
munication, our analysis of the 2012 Obama
Facebook campaign revealed elements of both
normalization (focus on candidate, underutiliza-
tion of the medium’s potential) and innova- 1205
tion (more positive tone, space for debate even
if the discourse is close-ended). Despite not-
ing that the claims of postmodern campaign-
ing are overstated, Larsson (2013) argues that
the potential for structural change rests with 1210
politicians and with citizens, because both sides
have the resources to enforce change. As shown
earlier, the Obama campaign’s followers were
quite selective in what types of messages they
interacted with, largely overlooking promotional 1215
posts such as calls to action and celebrity
endorsements, and engaging with character and
family messages as well as policy statements,
which would seem to go against fears of “dumb-
ing down.” 1220
The question then arises: is the highly sophis-
ticated, digitized, and personalized permanent
campaign inherently at odds with a mode
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of substantive citizen-politician communication
and even coproduction of political ideas? Will it1225
ever be possible—and is it even desirable—to
combine the efficiency, highly strategic mes-
sages, centralized operations, and war-like men-
tality of political campaigning with substantive
forms of civic interaction? Such civic input, if1230
not necessarily shaping policy, could at least
enhance both politicians’ understanding of the
reality on the ground and citizens’ understand-
ing of the complexities and constraints of con-
temporary policy making in a highly globalized,1235
decentralized, and interdependent world. Such
dialogue might have significant benefits for both
sides, boosting empathy and systemic trust, even
if politicians were to stand their ground (which
might actually enhance their popular standing).1240
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NOTE
1. Because the recording of posts only started on
October 10, 2012, the samples were initially divided into
two groups; post interactions from before October 10
(39 days) were recorded after the post had been published1255
for a while. For example, a post from September 10 had
a month of exposure when recorded while a post from
October 1 merely had 10 days of exposure, potentially
compromising the comparability of the number of interac-
tions, because these accumulate over an indefinite period of1260
time. Samples recorded after October 10 were consistently
recorded every day. To counter this potential limitation, a
preliminary analysis was carried out to establish if these
two groups of posts could be compared. The number of
interactions in every post gathered after October 10 was1265
recorded repeatedly in the first five days after a post
was published to establish whether there was a saturation
threshold after which interaction with the post diminished.
The purpose of this was to ensure that the number of
interactions in posts recorded more than five days after 1270
they were published could be compared to other posts.
Our preliminary analysis showed that the number of new
interactions receded considerably after the third day and
almost ceded five days after a post was originally pub-
lished, indicating that older posts coded after several days 1275
of exposure and newer posts coded consistently after five
days constituted a homogeneous and workable sample.
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